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1 Introduction
The certification requirements set out in the judgment of Wallis JA in 
Trustees for the time being of the Children’s Resource Centre Trust v Pioneer 
Food (Pty) Ltd (Legal Resources Centre as amicus curiae) (“Children’s 
Resource Centre Trust”)1 include that there must be a class, identifiable 
by objective criteria, and it must be shown that a class action is the most 
appropriate means of adjudicating the claims of the class members.2 A proper 
class definition inter alia enables the court to determine how notification to 
the putative class members should be given, to decide who does not form part 
of the class and may accordingly institute individual actions, and to establish 
who will be bound by the court’s order.3 The requirement that a class action 
must be appropriate is, according to Erasmus and Van Loggerenberg, aimed at 
ensuring that only claims that cannot feasibly be instituted as ordinary actions 
with multiple plaintiffs are brought as class actions.4 
In Children’s Resource Centre Trust, after having listed the certification 
requirements,5 Wallis JA proceeded to deal selectively with some of the 
requirements in more detail. He did not consider separately the certification 
requirement that a class action must be shown to be the most appropriate 
means of determining class members’ claims. Instead, he essentially dealt 
with this requirement in the context of the first certification requirement, 
namely that there must be a class, identifiable by objective criteria. In this 
regard, Wallis JA mentioned obiter that:
“In defining the class it is not necessary to identify all the members of the class. Indeed, if that were 
possible, there would be a question whether a class action was necessary, as joinder under Uniform 
Rule 10 would be permissible. It is, however, necessary that the class be defined with sufficient 
precision that a particular individual’s membership can be objectively determined by examining their 
situation in the light of the class definition.”6
It can be inferred from Wallis JA’s obiter dictum that, where all the claimants 
are identifiable,7 they may need to be joined as plaintiffs to the proceedings. 
1 2013 1 All SA 648 (SCA). 
2 Para 26.
3 HJ Erasmus & DE van Loggerenberg Erasmus: Superior Court Practice (RS 41 2013) A2-23. 
4 A2-25.
5 2013 1 All SA 648 (SCA) para 26. 
6 Para 29.
7 In the sense that the individual claimants can be named and specified. 
A class action may therefore not be the appropriate procedural device to be 
utilised in such circumstances. Wallis JA does, however, forgo saying that a 
class action may never be used if the claimants are all personally identifiable. 
In fact, Wallis JA mentions that there is a measure of overlap between the 
certification requirements8 and he also refers to the circumstances when a 
class action may be instituted in South Africa,9 such as where the class is large, 
where the class members are poor, and where the claims are not substantial 
enough to be pursued separately.10 
As mentioned, Wallis JA did not expressly deal with the certification 
requirement that a class action must be shown to be the most appropriate 
means of determining class members’ claims. He also stated that it is 
unnecessary to identify all the class members; otherwise, the necessity of a 
class action would be questionable. It accordingly remains unclear when, if 
at all, the identifiability of class members will preclude the certification of a 
class action. Moreover, it is unclear what the test is our courts must apply and 
what factors they must consider to determine the appropriateness of a class 
action. 
In Mukaddam v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd (“Mukaddam SCA”)11 the class 
action had been framed in an opt-in manner. This meant that the class would 
have been confined to those individuals who took the necessary steps to 
opt into the class action. Nugent JA held that a class action was not suitable 
in casu. He held that once the class is confined to claimants who choose 
positively to advance their claims and are required to come forward for that 
purpose, he could see no reason why they are not capable of doing so in their 
own names – they do not need a representative to do so on their behalf. He 
then stated that the court rules make specific provision for multiple plaintiffs 
to join in one action.12 The court in Mukkadam SCA therefore found, at the 
expense of the opt-in class action regime, joinder to be the more appropriate 
procedural device. 
A potential problem evidenced by the approach of the court in Mukaddam 
SCA is that where, for example, the individual claimants are poor, uneducated, 
and lack access to resources, or where the class is large, joinder may in fact be 
cumbersome and inappropriate, even though all the claimants are personally 
identifiable.13 This potential problem is significant in that a court ordering 




11 2013 2 SA 254 (SCA).
12 Para 12. Rule 10(1) of the Rules Regulating the Conduct of the Proceedings of the Several Provincial and 
Local Divisions of the High Court of South Africa allows joinder of multiple plaintiffs in a single action.
13 According to Erasmus & Van Loggerenberg Erasmus: Superior Court Practice A2-21, the traditional 
rules governing joinder may be impractical where the claimants comprise a large group and/or all the 
potential claimants have not yet been identified.
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underpinning the incorporation of the class action mechanism into South 
African law, namely access to justice.14 
The primary difficulties associated with joinder are that it is a cumbersome 
and costly process. An interested party is required to file an application15 
in terms of which the party’s direct and substantial interest in the matter 
is set out, and in terms of which the court is requested to join the party to 
the proceedings. Joinder is a costly procedure, since the interested party is 
generally required to make use of legal representation to bring the application. 
Cameron JA, in Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 
v Ngxuza (“Ngxuza”),16 referred to the difficulties associated with joinder and 
held as follows in this regard:
“It is precisely because so many in our country are in a ‘poor position to seek legal redress’, and 
because the technicalities of legal procedure, including joinder, may unduly complicate the attainment 
of justice, that both the interim Constitution and the Constitution created the express entitlement that 
‘anyone’ asserting a right in the Bill of Rights could litigate ‘as a member of, or in the interest of, a 
group or class of persons”.17 
In Mukaddam v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd (“Mukaddam CC”),18 Jafta J 
referred to section 173 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 (“Constitution”) and confirmed the power of our superior courts to 
protect and regulate their own processes and, where necessary, to develop 
the common law to give effect to the interests of justice. Jafta J held that 
the interests of justice should guide our courts when considering class action 
certification applications.19 Regarding the certification “requirements” 
mentioned in Children’s Resource Centre Trust, Jafta J in Mukaddam CC 
stated as follows: 
“In Children’s Resource Centre … the Supreme Court of Appeal laid down requirements for 
certification. These requirements must serve as factors to be taken into account in determining where 
the interests of justice lie in a particular case. They must not be treated as conditions precedent or 
jurisdictional facts which must be present before an application for certification may succeed. The 
absence of one or another requirement must not oblige a court to refuse certification where the 
interests of justice demand otherwise.”20
14 The South African Law Commission The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest Actions in 
South African Law Report Project 88 (1998) paras 1.3-1.4. See also the South African Law Commission 
The Recognition of a Class Action in South African Law Working Paper 57 Project 88 (1995) para 5.28 
where it is stated that “[t]he whole purpose of class actions is to facilitate access to justice for the man 
on the street”. See also Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ngxuza 2001 4 SA 
1184 (SCA) para 1 where Cameron JA states that “[t]he law is a scarce resource in South Africa. This case 
shows that justice is even harder to come by. It concerns the ways in which the poorest in our country 
are to be permitted access to both”. In Mukaddam v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd 2013 2 SA 254 (SCA) para 
11 it is stated that “[t]he justification for recognising class actions is that without that procedural device 
claimants will be denied access to the courts”. In Mukaddam v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd 2013 5 SA 89 (CC) 
para 29 Jafta J stated that “[a]ccess to courts is fundamentally important to our democratic order. It is not 
only a cornerstone of the democratic architecture but also a vehicle through which the protection of the 
Constitution itself may be achieved”. 
15 Notice of motion supported by affidavit(s). 
16 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA). 
17 Para 6. 
18 2013 10 BCLR 1135 (CC). 
19 Paras 33-34.
20 Para 35.
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In other words, according to the Constitutional Court in Mukaddam CC, 
the certification “requirements” laid down in Children’s Resource Centre 
Trust should be treated as a set of relevant “factors” that have to be taken into 
account when determining whether or not the class action should be certified. 
A court is also not limited to considering these factors only and may consider 
other relevant factors not mentioned by Wallis JA.21 Further, in examining 
the prevalence or absence of each or all of the above-mentioned factors, the 
court’s certification decision should be informed by the interests of justice.22 
The law in the foreign jurisdictions that will be considered in this article 
relating to the circumstances when a class action should be used rather than 
joinder is comprehensively dealt with in statute, supplemented by an extensive 
body of case law. However, the position in South Africa is essentially as set 
out in the Children’s Resource Centre Trust, Mukaddam SCA and Mukaddam 
CC cases. The court in Mukaddam CC did not deal with the comments of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA”) on joinder. This article accordingly, and 
especially in the light of the experiences of foreign jurisdictions, considers 
what test our courts should apply and what factors they should consider when 
determining the appropriateness of a class action compared to joinder. It also 
considers when, if at all, the identifiability of class members will preclude the 
certification of a class action. 
2  Class action as an appropriate procedural device compared 
to joinder
2 1 American federal class action 
The threshold requirements for certification of a class action are contained 
in rule 23(a) of the American Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Federal 
Rules”). These certification requirements are generally referred to as 
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation.23 The 
relevant certification requirement that merits consideration in the context of 
the class action as an appropriate procedural device compared to joinder, is 
the numerosity requirement contained in rule 23(a)(1) of the Federal Rules.
Rule 23(a)(1) provides that a court may certify a class only if it “is so 
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable”. Where joinder is 
found to be practicable, there will be no need for a class action.24 According 
to Anderson and Trask, the numerosity requirement does not merely require 
21 Mukaddam v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd 2013 5 SA 89 (CC) para 47. According to W de Vos “Opt-in Class 
Action for Damages Vindicated by Constitutional Court: Mukaddam v Pioneer Foods CCT 131/12” (2013) 
4 TSAR 757 765-766, relegating the requirements for a class action to mere ‘factors’ under the umbrella 
of ‘the interests of justice’ is questionable. He states that “[t]his flies in the face of the very nature of a 
class action and the position in the leading class action regimes. A class action is very different from an 
ordinary civil suit. For a class action to proceed as such certain essential requirements must be satisfied, 
otherwise it would be a travesty to call it a class action”.
22 Nkala v Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited ZAGPJHC case nos 48226/12, 31324/12, 31326/12, 
31327/12, 48226/12, 08108/13 of 13 May 2016 para 32.
23 PG Karlsgodt “United States” in PG Karlsgodt (ed) World Class Actions – A Guide to Group and 
Representative Actions around the Globe (2012) 22.  
24 RH Klonoff Class Actions and Other Multi-party Litigation in a Nutshell 4 ed (2012) 39.
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consideration of the number of putative class members. They state that 
consideration must also be given to “whether aggregating the claims of the 
known class members would be feasible without a class action”.25 They 
accordingly propose using feasibility, in addition to the number of putative 
class members, as the key considerations in determining whether joinder is 
impracticable and hence whether the numerosity requirement is met.
The numerosity requirement does not require a claimant to identify the 
exact number of class members. However, the claimant would need to show 
that there is a sufficiently large number of people in the class to discharge the 
rule 23 burden. It has been suggested that, while there is no magic number 
for satisfying numerosity, most courts will allow a class action to proceed if 
the class consists of at least 40 members.26 Further, it is generally accepted 
that “when class size reaches substantial proportions … the impracticability 
requirement and hence the numerosity requirement is usually satisfied by the 
numbers alone”.27 In other words, the bigger the class, the more likely it is 
that joinder will be impracticable. 
Regarding the feasibility consideration, class proceedings may be 
appropriate where joinder is possible but not necessarily feasible.28 
Ultimately, it would seem that if joinder is possible but would needlessly 
complicate the litigation of the case, then class action proceedings may be 
appropriate.29 However, impracticability does not mean impossibility.30 
In addition to having to satisfy the requirements for certification, 
including the numerosity requirement, each class action must satisfy the 
requirements of either rules 23(b)(1), 23(b)(2), or 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(3) 
pertains to the opt-out damages class action and specifically requires that 
a court should assess whether class action proceedings is “superior to other 
available methods for fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy”. The 
superiority requirement “reflects a broad policy of economy in the use of 
society’s difference-settling machinery”.31 Rule 23(b)(3)(A)-(D) lists four 
factors that a court must consider in making this assessment: 
“(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defence of separate 
actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or 
against class members;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular 
forum; and
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.”
25 B Anderson & A Trask Class Action Playbook (2014) 25-26. 
26 26.
27 MH Greer A Practitioner’s Guide to Class Actions (2010) 58. 
28 Anderson & Trask Class Action Playbook 26-27.
29 26-27.
30 In Robidoux v Celani 987 F.2d 931, 935-936, the court held that “the district court in the present case, 
in concluding that numerosity was lacking because plaintiffs had not shown the class to be so large 
that joinder was ‘impossible’, applied the wrong standard”. See also Eggleston v Chicago Journeymen 
Plumbers’ Local Union No. 130, U.A. 657 F.2d 890, 895 (7th Cir. 1981) and Greer Practitioner’s Guide to 
Class Actions 60.
31 Berley v Dreyfus & Co., 43 F.R.D 397, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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In Lake v First Nationwide Bank32 it was held that, in performing the 
superiority analysis, the court must consider the “inability of the poor or 
uninformed to enforce their rights, and the improbability that large numbers 
of class members would possess the initiative to litigate individually”. 
Specifically, the manageability requirement in rule 23(b)(3)(D) “encompass[es] 
the whole range of practical problems that may render the class action 
format inappropriate for a particular suit”.33 It entails that a court focuses 
on the advantages of a class action compared to alternative forms of dispute 
resolution that may be available to the claimants, such as litigation through 
joinder. In In re Managed Care Litigation34 it was held that this consideration 
“requires the Court to determine whether there is a better method of handling 
the controversy other than through the class action mechanism”. In Carnegie v 
Mutual Saving Life Insurance Company35 it was held that, where management 
problems may result in class proceedings being less fair and efficient than 
other dispute resolution methods, then a class action would be improper. 
Manageability, as required by rule 23(b)(3)(D), becomes an important 
consideration where the administrative costs incurred in managing the class 
action will consume the award made in favour of the plaintiff class.36 A 
further factor to be considered in the context of manageability is the difficulty 
associated with notifying a significant percentage of the class – this may 
count against possible certification.
Although courts are reluctant to certify classes whose members would 
be difficult to communicate with or to identify, the sheer size of the class 
would not necessarily result in the denial of certification.37 Further, although 
certification generally should not be denied solely on the ground that class 
members would have to prove their damages on an individualised basis, 
potential difficulty in calculating damages might be a factor in assessing 
manageability. Further factors considered in determining superiority include 
whether an alternative regulatory mechanism exists and whether a class 
action would achieve significant judicial efficiencies.38 
2 2 Australia 
The approach of the Australian federal class action regime may be worth 
considering in order to determine what test our courts should apply and what 
factors they should consider when determining the appropriateness of a class 
action compared to joinder. The Australian approach may also be relevant to 
determine when, if at all, the identifiability of class members will preclude the 
certification of a class action. 
32 156 FRD 615, 625 (E.d.Pa. 1994).
33 Eisen v Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S 156, 164 (1974).
34 209 F.R.D 678, 692 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
35 No. CV-99-S-3292-NE, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21396, at 76-77 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 1, 2002).
36 Anderson & Trask Class Action Playbook 62.
37 Klonoff Class Actions and Other Multi-party Litigation in a Nutshell 131.
38 132.
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In Australia’s federal class action regime, unlike the American class action 
regime, there is no certification procedure.39 However, in order to commence 
a class action in Australia, three threshold requirements must be satisfied, 
namely:
•	 at least seven persons must have claims against the same person;
•	 the claims must arise out of the same, similar or related circumstances; 
and
•	 the claims must give rise to at least one substantial common issue of law 
or fact.40
In terms of section 33H of the Federal Court of Australia Act of 1976 (“Federal 
Court Act”), an application commencing a representative proceeding41 must 
describe or otherwise identify the group members to whom the proceeding 
relates. It must also specify the nature of the claims made, the relief claimed as 
well as the questions of law or fact common to the group members’ claims.42 It 
is, however, unnecessary to name or specify the number of group members.43 
Once a representative proceeding has been instituted, it will continue 
unless the respondent applies to the court for an order terminating it.44 
Thus, unlike the South African and American class action regimes where 
the party bringing the action must prove that certain requirements are 
met before certification is granted, it is up to the respondent to raise non-
compliance with the requirements. Nevertheless, a termination order may 
still be granted notwithstanding compliance with the above-mentioned 
threshold requirements. In this regard, the Federal Court is empowered in 
terms of sections 33L, 33M and 33N of the Federal Court Act to order the 
discontinuance of a representative proceeding under Part IV(A) where:
• in terms of section 33L, it appears likely to the court at any stage of a 
representative proceeding that there are less than seven group members; 
• in terms of section 33M, “(a) the relief claimed in a representative 
proceeding is or includes payment of money to group members (otherwise 
than in respect of costs); and (b) on application by the respondent, the 
court concludes that it is likely that, if judgment were to be given in favour 
of the representative party, the cost to the respondent of identifying the 
group members and distributing to them the amounts ordered to be paid 
to them would be excessive having regard to the likely total of those 
amounts”; or 
• in terms of section 33N, it is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to 
do so for one or more of the reasons specified in section 33N(1)(a)-(d).
39 The Supreme Courts of Victoria and New South Wales have class action regimes, which largely mirror the 
Australian Federal Court class action regime. 
40 Section 33C of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth); V Morabito “Australia” in DR Hensler, C 
Hodges & M Tulibacka (eds) The Globalization of Class Actions (2009) 320 322.
41 SS Clark, J Kellam & L Cook “Australia” in P G Karlsgodt (ed) World Class Actions – A Guide to Group 
and Representative Actions around the Globe (2012) 392 406.
42 Section 33H(1).
43 Section 33H(2).
44 Clark et al “Australia” in World Class Actions – A Guide to Group and Representative Actions around the 
Globe 411.
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Section 33N provides that a respondent may apply to court for an order, 
or the court may decide mero motu that the proceedings under Part IVA be 
discontinued, where it is satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to do so 
because:
“(a)  the costs that would be incurred if the proceeding were to continue as a representative proceeding 
are likely to exceed the costs that would be incurred if each group member conducted a separate 
proceeding; or
“(b)  all the relief sought can be obtained by means of a proceeding other than a representative 
proceeding under this Part; or
“(c)  the representative proceeding will not provide an efficient and effective means of dealing with 
the claims of group members; or
“(d)  it is otherwise inappropriate that the claims be pursued by means of a representative proceeding.” 
In terms of section 33N, the first issue that a court must decide is whether 
one of the conditions in paragraphs (1)(a)-(d) has been satisfied, which involves 
comparing the representative proceeding to other available alternatives, such 
as joinder. If another alternative is available, the court must then consider 
whether, due to the existence and appropriateness of that alternative, it is 
in the interests of justice to grant an order terminating the representative 
proceeding.45 
As mentioned, section 33N(1)(b) provides that a respondent can apply 
to court for an order to discontinue proceedings where all the relief sought 
can be obtained by means of a proceeding other than a representative 
proceeding.46 Although the same relief can generally be obtained by instituting 
individualised proceedings, it may, for example, be that class members are 
unidentifiable, that the class is numerous and that individual proceedings 
are not feasible, or that it would be too costly to pursue individualised 
proceedings. In such circumstances, it is unlikely that a court would order 
the discontinuance of class proceedings in terms of section 33N(1)(b).47 
Further, in terms of section 33N(1)(c), if the representative proceeding 
will not provide an efficient and effective means of dealing with the claims 
of group members, the court can also order its discontinuance. In Wong v 
Silkfield Pty Ltd,48 Spender J held that:
“Ultimately, if because of the extent of non-common issues, representative proceedings in the 
assessment of the court are not the preferable means of dealing efficiently and effectively with the 
claims, the court will no doubt terminate the representative nature of the proceedings ...” 
Similarly, in Hall v Australian Finance Direct Ltd,49 Hollingworth J of the 
Supreme Court of Victoria held that “[t]he fact that a proceeding will at some 
stage involve an examination of numerous individual contracts or transactions 
45 Clark et al “Australia” in World Class Actions – A Guide to Group and Representative Actions around 
the Globe 414-415. See also, for example, McLean v Nicholson 2002 172 FLR 90 at paras 7,12 where the 
court held that section 33N(1)(b) clearly applied to the facts of the case and that joinder was a suitable 
alternative to the representative proceedings. 
46 In McLean v Nicholson 2002 172 FLR 90 it was held that section 33N(1)(b) clearly applied insofar as the 
relief sought could be obtained by litigation through joinder. The court considered the fact that there were 
only ten (identifiable) plaintiffs and that such a procedure would therefore not be unfeasible. 
47 P Cashman Class Action Law and Practice (2007) 311-312.
48 1998 ATPR 41-613, 40, 726 approved in Wong v Silkfield Pty Ltd (1999) 199 CLR 255, 33.
49 2005 VSC 306.
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has not prevented courts from allowing the common issues to be determined 
in [a] group proceeding”.50 Hollingworth J cautioned against exercising the 
court’s power under section 33N before, at least, the utility of the class action 
regime has been exhausted by a resolution of the common issues.51 
Representative proceedings can also be discontinued in terms of section 
33N(1)(d) where it is otherwise inappropriate for the claims to be pursued by 
means of a representative proceeding. It has been suggested that the power to 
order that the matter does not proceed as a class action where it is “otherwise 
inappropriate” is very broad and that there will usually be many competing 
issues to consider. In this regard: “costs, availability of relief, the size of the 
group, the period of time over which the breaches occurred, delays, and the 
nature of the causes of action, might make it inappropriate to pursue the 
claims by way of class action proceedings”.52 
Even if the criteria specified in section 33N(1)(a)-(d) are satisfied, the court 
must nevertheless be satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to make 
an order terminating the representative proceeding.53 In Bright v Femcare 
Limited (“Femcare”),54 Finkelstein J held that: 
“Whether or not it is in the interests of justice to make such an order has to be weighed against the 
public interest in the administration of justice that favours class actions. That requires one to consider 
the principal objects of the class action procedure. They are: (1) To promote the efficient use of court 
time and the parties’ resources by eliminating the need to separately try the same issue; (2) To provide 
a remedy in favour of persons who may not have the funds to bring a separate action, or who may not 
bring an action because the cost of litigation is disproportionate to the value of the claim; and (3) To 
protect defendants from multiple suits and the risk of inconsistent findings.”55
Should a court make an order in terms of sections 33L, 33M, or 33N, 
discontinuing the representative proceeding, the representative party may 
continue it against the respondent on his or her own behalf.56 In addition, 
any person who was a class member for the purpose of the representative 
proceeding, may apply to court for an order joining him or her as an applicant 
to the proceeding.57 
There are various similarities and differences between the threshold 
requirements in section 33C of the Federal Court Act and the certification 
requirements contained in rule 23 of the Federal Rules.58 Although section 
33C does not require it to be impracticable to join class members, the 
requirements of numerosity and commonality are conceptually similar to 
subsections 33C(1)(a) and (c). There is no requirement in section 33C similar 
to the typicality requirement contained in rule 23. The adequacy requirement 
is also not embodied in section 33C, but it has been suggested that this 
50 Para 50.
51 Para 52.
52 Cashman Class Action Law and Practice 321.
53 321. 
54 2002 FCAFC 243; 195 ALR 574.
55 Para 152. See, eg, in Huang v Minister of State for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1997) 50 ALD 
134.
56 Section 33P(a).
57 Section 33P(b). See also Cashman Class Action Law and Practice 323.
58 D Grave, K Adams & J Betts Class Actions in Australia (2012) 128.
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requirement is similar to section 33T which permits the court to substitute a 
representative party if they are unable to adequately represent the interests of 
group members.59 
According to Grave, Adams and Betts, the tendency of Australian courts 
has been not to place too much reliance on American case law regarding its 
certification requirements for guidance as to the proper interpretation of the 
threshold requirements under section 33C of the Federal Court Act.60 This 
is essentially the result of statutory differences between rule 23 and section 
33C and the increasing body of Australian jurisprudence available to provide 
direct guidance on interpretation-related questions.61 
2 3 Ontario 
The approach in Ontario is also relevant to establish the test that our courts 
should use to determine the appropriateness of class proceedings. In Ontario, 
similar to South Africa and the United States but unlike Australia, a class 
action cannot be commenced without certification by a court.62 Section 5(1) 
of the Ontario Act provides that a class action should be certified where the 
following criteria are met:
“(a) the pleadings or the notice of application discloses a cause of action; 
“(b)  there is an identifiable class of two or more persons that would be represented by the 
representative plaintiff or defendant;
“(c) the claims or defences of the class members raise common issues;
“(d)  a class proceeding would be the preferable procedure for the resolution of the common issues; 
and
“(e) there is a representative plaintiff or defendant who:
“(i) would fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class;
“(ii) has produced a plan for the proceeding that sets out a workable method of advancing the 
proceeding on behalf of the class and of notifying class members of the proceeding; and 
“(iii) does not have, on the common issues for the class, an interest in conflict with the interests 
of other class members.” 
In Hollick v Toronto (City) (“Hollick”),63 it was held that section 5(1)(d) 
merits consideration of whether the proposed class action would be a “fair and 
manageable method” to advance the plaintiffs’ claims, taking into account 
the importance of the common issues in relation to the claims as a whole. To 
determine whether the proposed class action would be a fair and manageable 
method of advancing the plaintiffs’ claims, the court must consider whether, 
if the proposed common issues are resolved, it would advance the action in 
a significant way.64 Importantly, the court must also consider alternatives 
to, and justifications for, class proceedings to determine whether it is the 
most appropriate way of dealing with the class members’ claim(s). Such an 
59 130.
60 130.
61 In Carnie v Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd (1995) 182 CLR 398, the High Court cautioned that it was 
“unprofitable and difficult” to make a precise comparison between a class action commenced under rule 
23 and its Australian equivalent. 
62 H M Rosenberg & J Kalajdzic “Certification” in J Walker & G D Watson (eds) Class Actions in Canada: 
Cases, Notes, and Materials (2014) 55 55. 
63 2001 3 SCR 158.
64 Para 32.
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alternative would, for example, include joinder.65 The court also held that 
“the preferability inquiry should be conducted through the lens of the three 
principal advantages of class actions – judicial economy, access to justice, 
and behaviour modification”.66 
In Markson v MBNA Canada Bank67 Rosenberg JA summarised the 
principles applicable to determining whether a class action is the preferable 
procedure as follows:
“(1) The preferability inquiry should be conducted through the lens of the three principal advantages 
of a class proceeding: judicial economy, access to justice and behaviour modification;
(2) ‘Preferable’ is to be construed broadly and is meant to capture the two ideas of whether the class 
proceeding would be a fair, efficient and manageable method of advancing the claim and whether a 
class proceeding would be preferable to other procedures such as joinder, test cases, consolidation and 
any other means of resolving the dispute; and
(3) The preferability determination must be made by looking at the common issues in context, 
meaning, the importance of the common issues must be taken into account in relation to the claims 
as a whole.”68
According to Rosenberg JA, the preferability inquiry does not entail 
conducting separate inquiries in respect of each of the above-mentioned 
principles. To the contrary, “the inquiry into the questions of judicial economy, 
access to justice and behaviour modification can only be answered by 
considering the context, the other available procedures and, in short, whether 
a class proceeding is a fair, efficient and manageable method of advancing the 
claim”.69
In Excalibur Special Opportunities LP v Schwartz Levitsky Feldman LLP 
(“Excalibur”),70 Perell J concluded that, on the facts, joinder was the preferable 
procedure compared to a class action.71 In arriving at this conclusion, he held 
that it is relatively easy to satisfy the preferable procedure criterion and that, in 
casu, apart from failing to show that a class action was necessary to overcome 
any barriers to access to justice, a class action was not necessary to achieve 
judicial economy or to effect behaviour modification.72
Recently, in Excalibur Special Opportunities LP v Schwartz Levitsky 
Feldman LLP (“Excalibur ODC”),73 the Ontario Divisional Court (“ODC”) 
upheld the ruling of Perell J. It was argued that Perell J incorrectly found 
that joinder was the preferable procedure, as the respondent did not raise 
joinder in their submissions in the certification application. In response to 
this argument, Lederer J held that “[j]oinder is not simply an alternative, 
it is the default position in considering whether a class proceeding is or is 
not the preferable procedure”.74 It was found that Perell J had not imposed 
65 See, eg, Hollick v Toronto (City) 2001 3 SCR 158 para 28 where the court referred to the preferability of 
class proceedings compared “to other procedures such as joinder…” 
66 Paras 27-32.
67 2007 ONCA 334, 85 OR (3d) 321.
68 Para 69.
69 Para 70. See also AIC Limited v Fischer 2013 SCC 69 para 79.
70 2007 ONCA 334, 85 OR (3d) 321.
71 Para 218.
72 Para 217.
73 2015 ONSC 1634.
74 Para 13.
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joinder on the plaintiff, but had simply pointed out that joinder “would provide 
effective redress for Excalibur and … other investors could join the action as 
co-plaintiffs”.75 
In view of the above, it can be concluded that the point of departure in 
Ontario law to determine whether a class action is the preferable procedure, is 
to ascertain whether it represents a fair, efficient, and manageable procedure 
that is preferable to any alternative method of resolving the claims. This 
is measured with regard to the underlying policy objectives of access to 
justice, behaviour modification, and judicial economy and the extent to which 
certification furthers those objectives. In considering an alternative to a class 
action, the court should examine whether that option could provide suitable 
procedural protections and effective redress for the claims being made.76 
Specifically, it appears that courts should continue to apply the preferable 
procedure criteria set out in AIC Limited v Fischer (“AIC”) .77 This entails 
that courts “focus on the underlying purpose and nature of the alternative 
proceeding as compared with the class proceeding” and that they “assess the 
capacity of the alternative procedure to adequately resolve the claims raised 
by the class members”.78 Sachs J for the minority stated that Perell J failed to 
follow AIC and that, if he had properly conducted the access to justice analysis 
detailed in AIC, he would not have concluded that joinder was the preferable 
procedure.79 Lederer J, however, held that Perell J had in fact applied the 
preferable procedure criteria set out in AIC.80
Accordingly, the fact that the majority of the ODC upheld the ruling of 
Perell J is relevant insofar as it provides insight into the interpretation and 
application of the preferable procedure requirement by Ontario courts. 
Perell J, in applying the preferable procedure requirement, essentially found 
that joinder was preferable because there were no significant economic, 
psychological or social barriers to individual actions. The applicants failed to 
show that there was a “genuine need” for the common issues to be resolved 
on a class-wide basis. In this regard, Perell J emphasised that the proposed 
representative plaintiff had a claim of almost $1 million that would justify 
taking on the litigation risk – it did not genuinely need a class action to obtain 
access to justice; the class members were all known and were all “accredited 
investors” with a net worth of at least $1 million or two years of $200,000 
plus income – they were therefore not without resources to litigate; there was 
enough money at stake to warrant a contingency fee arrangement even without 
a class action; a class action would achieve only modest judicial economy 
over individual actions or the joinder of claims; there were no psychological 
or social barriers to bring individual claims; while a class action would be 
manageable, it would also be more procedurally cumbersome and protracted 
75 Para 13.
76 Para 10.
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than a regular action; and behaviour modification was not needed beyond the 
behaviour modification that derives from a regular tort action.81
The founding papers in an application for certification of a class action in 
Ontario should, in view of the above, address the availability of joinder as 
an alternative to the class action, with regard to the considerations set out 
above. In particular, respondents should consider addressing inter alia the 
availability of joinder as an available alternative to the class action and the 
relative “necessity” of the class proceeding as a mechanism for pursuing the 
claims at issue, all within the framework detailed by the court in AIC. 
2 4 South Africa 
As we have seen, the law in the foreign jurisdictions referred to above 
regarding the circumstances when a class action, rather than joinder, should 
be utilised is, for the most part, comprehensively dealt with in statute and 
court rules, supplemented by an extensive body of case law. The approach of 
our courts in determining the appropriateness of a class action, in the absence 
of legislation and court rules regulating the issue, will be considered in more 
detail below.
2 4 1 Joinder as an alternative
Before considering the approach of our courts to determining the 
appropriateness of a class action, a brief note on joinder may be appropriate. 
Rule 10(3) of the Rules Regulating the Conduct of the Proceedings of the 
Several Provincial and Local Divisions of the High Court of South Africa 
(“Uniform Rules”) defines the joinder of defendants as follows:
“Several defendants may be sued in one action… whenever the question arising between them, or 
any of them and the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs depends upon the determination of substantially 
the same question of law or fact which if such defendants were sued separately would arise in each 
separate action.”82
Under the common law, a number of defendants may be joined whenever 
convenience so requires.83 In this regard, Caney J in Anderson v Gordik 
Organisation84 held that joinder may be justified even if the person joined is 
not a necessary party85 and accepted that the court could, in a proper case, 
permit joinder purely on the grounds of convenience especially in order to 
save costs or to avoid multiplicity of actions.86 In such a case, the right of 
relief of the party sought to be joined to the proceedings must be dependent 
upon determining substantially the same question of law or fact.87 Rule 10(1) 
of the Uniform Rules, which allows joinder on the grounds of convenience 
81 Paras 25 and 209.
82 See Fluxmans Incorporated v Lithos Corporation of South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2015 2 SA 322 (GJ) para 4.
83 See Van der Lith v Alberts 1944 TPD 17. See also McIndoe (in their capacities as joint liquidators of G&D 
Shoes (Pvt) Ltd and Belmont Leather (Pvt) Ltd) v Royce Shoes (Pty) Ltd 2000 3 All SA 19 (W) 24.
84 1962 2 SA 68 (D).
85 70D-E.
86 72-72.
87 AC Cilliers, C Loots & C Nel Herbstein & Van Winsen Civil Practice of the High Courts of South Africa 
5 ed (2009) 211-212.
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under certain circumstances, complements this common-law power. In 
Vitorakis v Wolf88 it was held that “our modern rules of court are so explicit 
on this point that there is now hardly anything left of the basic common-law 
approach to joinder and intervention”.89 However in Rabinowitz NNO v Ned-
Equity Insurance Co Ltd90 the court held that the rules were not intended to be 
exhaustive of the cases in which a party may be joined and that the court could 
still exercise its common-law power to allow joinder whenever convenience 
so requires.91 Victor J, in Fluxmans Incorporated v Lithos Corporation of 
SA,92 held that:
“Parties may only be joined as a matter of necessity and not convenience. It is only necessary if 
the parties sought to be joined would be prejudicially affected by the judgment of the court in the 
proceedings. See Judicial Service Commission and Another v Cape Bar Council and another 2013 (1) 
SA 170 (SCA) at par [12] where the court held that: ‘It has by now become settled law that the joinder 
of a party is only required as a matter of necessity — as opposed to a matter of convenience — if 
that party has a direct and substantial interest which may be affected prejudicially by the judgment of 
the court in the proceedings concerned (see eg Bowring NO v Vrededorp Properties CC and Another 
2007 (5) SA 391 (SCA) para 21). The mere fact that a party may have an interest in the outcome of 
the litigation does not warrant a non-joinder plea. The right of a party to validly raise the objection 
that other parties should have been joined to the proceedings, has thus been held to be a limited one.’”
In Shake’s Multi-Save Supermarket CC v Haffejee; In re: Shake’s Multi-
Save Supermarket CC v Haffejee (“Shakes”),93 an application of joinder was 
opposed by arguing that joinder of parties on the basis of convenience is no 
longer possible.94 Reliance was placed on the above comment of Victor J. In 
Shakes, Landman J held as follows:
“In my view, the grammatical construction of the dictum of the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
the Judicial Service Commission judgment does not support the proposition. The court also made it 
clear that it was not concerned with joinder as a matter of convenience and that a plea of non-joinder 
can only be sustained if a person, who is not party to the action, has a direct and substantial interest 
which may be prejudicially affected by the judgment of the court in the proceedings in question. If the 
court in Fluxman Incorporated meant to say that parties may only be joined as a matter of necessity I 
would respectfully disagree. It is competent for the plaintiff to seek to join the Close Corporation on 
the grounds of convenience.”95
As is evident from the above, an alternative to joinder on the basis of 
convenience is that parties may be joined on the basis of necessity because 
the party who seeks to be joined has a direct and substantial interest in the 
matter.96 Where it is apparent that there is another party with a direct and 
substantial interest in the matter, the court has no discretion to allow the 
matter to proceed without joinder. This is because of the principle of audi 
alteram partem; interested parties should be afforded an opportunity to be 
88 1973 4 All SA 109 (W). 
89 112.
90 1980 3 All SA 694 (W).
91 697.
92 (No 2) 2012 2 SA 322 (GJ) para 5.
93 (413/12) 2015 ZANWHC 48 (21 August 2015).
94 Para 3.
95 Para 4.
96 Joinder of necessity is not governed by the court rules. Guidance must be sought from case law as to when 
joinder of parties is necessary. 
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heard before an order is made that will affect them.97 However, where the 
court is satisfied that there has been waiver of a right to be joined, joinder of 
necessity can effectively be circumvented. 
A direct and substantial interest has been held to be “an interest in the right 
which is the subject-matter of the litigation and not merely a financial interest 
which is only an indirect interest in such litigation”.98 It is a legal interest in 
the subject matter and the outcome of the litigation, excluding an indirect 
commercial interest. The possibility of such an interest is sufficient, and it 
is not necessary for the court to determine that it does in fact exist.99 In the 
absence of a direct and substantial interest, a court has a discretion to order 
joinder based on convenience.100
In order to show that a class action is the most appropriate means to adjudicate 
class members’ claims, the appropriateness of joinder as an alternative would 
also need to be considered. The above exposition of joinder of necessity and 
convenience will accordingly become relevant when considering the South 
African position regarding the assessment of the appropriateness of class 
proceedings set out below. 
2 4 2 Class action objectives
In Ngxuza, Cameron JA held that the primary feature of class actions is 
that, although they are not formally and individually joined, class members 
benefit from, and are bound by, the outcome of the class action, unless they 
opt out.101 He referred to the fact that, until 1994, if a claimant wanted to 
participate in existing court proceedings, he or she had to comply with the 
formalities of joinder.102 Cameron JA accordingly dealt with the differences 
between joinder and a class action and the circumstances where a class action 
would be more appropriate than litigating through joinder.103 
In Excalibur ODC, Sachs J referred to the frailties of joinder as an alternative 
procedure as recognised by the Ontario Law Reform Commission.104 He 
stated that joinder would not be of much assistance to individuals with small 
claims, especially insofar as individual litigants will generally be liable for the 
costs pertaining to their legal representation whether the action succeeds or 
fails. And if it fails, they may also be liable for the defendant’s costs. Further, 
according to Sachs J, “[i]f the victims of a mass wrong are a less than cohesive 
group, all are unlikely to be joined in one action … the result will be a 
multiplicity of proceedings, with the concomitant risk of inconsistent verdicts, 
additional expense for the parties and a greater burden on the courts”.105
97 Cilliers et al Civil Practice of the High Courts of South Africa 208.
98 Bohlokong Black Taxi Association v Interstate Bus Lines (Pty) Ltd 1997 4 SA 635 (O) 644A-B.
99 Cilliers et al Civil Practice of the High Courts of South Africa 217-218.
100 219.
101 Para 4. Or, unless they have not opted into the class action. 
102 Para 4.
103 Paras 4-5. 
104 Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Class Actions Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General 
(1982) 82-86.
105 Para 89.
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According to Cameron JA, because there are so many poor individuals in 
South Africa who do not have the necessary resources to litigate, and because 
there are technicalities associated with joinder, the attainment of justice 
could be unduly complicated.106 He did not comment on the identifiability 
of class members and its impact on the appropriateness of class proceedings. 
Cameron JA attached significant weight to access to justice as a consideration 
in deciding the appropriateness of a class action compared to joinder. He held 
that the needs of the types of individuals referred to above “who are most 
lacking in protective and assertive armour” should inform our understanding 
of the provisions of the Constitution, and that “it is against the background 
of their constitutional entitlements” that the class action provision in the 
Bill of Rights must be interpreted.107 Cameron JA emphasised that, although 
there is no legislative framework regulating class actions in South Africa, 
section 39(2) of the Constitution enjoins the courts to promote the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights when developing the common law, 
and upon which section 173 confers inherent power to develop the common 
law, taking the interests of justice into account.108 
In Pretorius v Transnet Second Defined Benefit Fund (“Pretorius”),109 
Makgoba J referred to Ngxuza and confirmed the finding of the SCA that the 
courts are enjoined by section 39(1)(a) of the Constitution to interpret the Bill 
of Rights so as to “promote the values that underlie an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom” and, in terms of 
subsection (2), to develop the common law so as to “promote the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights”.110 With reference to sections 39(2) and 173 of 
the Constitution, Makgoba J held that the provisions regarding a class action 
must be interpreted “generously and expansively, consistent with the mandate 
given to the courts to uphold the Constitution, thus ensuring that the rights 
in the Constitution enjoy the full measure of protection to which they are 
entitled”.111 In relation to assessing the appropriateness of class proceedings, 
Makgoba J held as follows: 
“The situation in the present case seems pattern-made for class proceedings. This is so in that the 
class the applicants represent in this case is drawn from the very poorest within our society (old 
pensioners), those in need of statutory social assistance. They also have the least chance of vindicating 
their rights through the ordinary legal process. As individuals they are unable to finance a legal 
action, given their meagre income in the form of pension moneys. What they have in common is 
that they are victims of official excess, bureaucratic misdirection and what they perceive as unlawful 
administrative methods.”112
The primary consideration taken into account by Makgoba J in deciding 
whether a class action is the most appropriate means of adjudicating the 
claims of the class members was access to justice. Specifically, Makgoba J 
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means of joinder and whether, through joinder, they would be able to vindicate 
their rights.113 
Makgoba J did not refer to the comments of Wallis JA in Children’s Resource 
Centre Trust or Nugent JA in Mukaddam SCA on the issue of joinder.114 He 
did, however, refer to Ngxuza and accordingly attributed significant weight 
to the impact of the claimants’ social and financial circumstances on their 
ability to vindicate their rights through a class action as opposed to some other 
mechanism, such as joinder. Accordingly, the court in Pretorius, as was the 
case in Ngxuza, attached significant weight to the claimants’ constitutional 
right of access to justice. However, the courts in Ngxuza and Pretorius did 
not provide guidance regarding the test that our courts should apply, and the 
factors that they should consider, when determining the appropriateness of a 
class action, compared to joinder. They also did not indicate when, if at all, the 
identifiability of class members will preclude class certification. 
2 4 3 Identifiability of class members 
The Ngxuza and Pretorius judgments differ significantly from the 
Mukaddam SCA judgment in respect of the courts’ approach to determining 
when a class action is the most appropriate means of adjudicating class 
members’ claims, as opposed to joinder. The identifiability of class members 
appears to be the key consideration that the court in Mukaddam SCA took 
into account to determine whether a class action is the appropriate means for 
adjudicating class members’ claims. Accordingly, where the individual class 
members are all identifiable, regardless of inter alia their financial means, the 
size of their individual claims and the size of the class, they may need to be 
joined as plaintiffs to the proceedings. A class action may therefore not be the 
appropriate procedural device to be utilised in such circumstances. However, 
where for example the individual class members are not in a financial 
position to vindicate their rights through ordinary litigation, where the class 
is numerous, or where the individual claims of class members are small, 
joinder may be costly, cumbersome and inappropriate. Requiring joinder in 
such circumstances may deprive class members of their right to access to 
justice. In other words, the fact that class members are identifiable should 
not necessarily mean that a class action is not the appropriate mechanism to 
adjudicate class members’ claims. Other considerations must be taken into 
account in making this determination. These considerations will be dealt with 
in more detail below. 
Hurter states that the approach adopted by the court in Ngxuza conforms to 
the view in foreign jurisdictions that the class should merely be ascertainable 
or identifiable and not require greater specificity. She states that “it would 
therefore be safe to say that in SA it will not be required that the identity of 
113 Para 26. 
114 The court in Mukaddam CC did not deal with the comments of Nugent JA in Mukaddam SCA on joinder.
22 STELL LR 2019 1
each member be known, but that it would be sufficient if it can be determined 
in some manner whether a person is a member of the class or group or not”.115 
It has been suggested in the context of the American class action that, 
while a class does not need to be ascertainable, if the plaintiff can identify 
each individual class member by name, the class may not be too numerous 
for joinder to be impracticable.116 However, the approach of the United 
States in this regard is that the identifiability of individual class members 
will form part of the assessment of the impracticability of joinder – it is not 
the only consideration in determining practicability of joinder compared to 
class proceedings.117 There are other relevant factors to consider, such as the 
geographical dispersion of class members. The more geographically dispersed 
the class is, the more difficult it would be to require joinder of individual class 
members. In other words, if the class is limited to a specific geographical 
territory, it is more likely that joinder would be feasible.118 Even where all 
the class members are identifiable, joinder is also likely to be impracticable 
where each class member’s claim is small or when the class members are poor, 
uneducated or lack the resources that are necessary to pursue their claims 
individually. In such circumstances, the class members are unlikely to litigate 
unless a class is certified, thus making joinder in the absence of a class all 
but impossible.119 Consideration will also be given to the ability and potential 
willingness of class members to institute individual actions.120 The facts of 
the specific case may also indicate other reasons why joinder is impracticable. 
In respect of representative proceedings in Australia, it is important to 
bear in mind that simply satisfying one of the requirements in section 33N is 
insufficient for the purpose of seeking the discontinuance of the representative 
proceeding. For example, where a court is of the view that the costs that 
would be incurred if the proceeding were to be continued as a representative 
proceeding are likely to exceed the costs that would be incurred if each group 
member conducted a separate proceeding, or where all the relief sought could 
be obtained by means of litigation through joinder,121 the court would also 
need to be convinced that it is in the interest of justice to grant the order 
discontinuing the representative proceeding.122
It would appear that the relevant considerations in determining the 
practicability of joinder and the superiority of class proceedings in the 
context of the American class action are similar to the considerations that 
are relevant in determining the appropriateness of representative proceedings 
in the context of the Australian Federal Court Act. For example, considering 
whether the representative proceeding will provide an efficient and effective 
 
115 E Hurter “The class action in South Africa: Quo Vadis” (2008) 41 De Jure 293 302.
116 Anderson & Trask Class Action Playbook 27.
117 Klonoff Class Actions and Other Multi-party Litigation in a Nutshell 40.
118 Anderson & Trask Class Action Playbook 27.
119 Klonoff Class Actions and Other Multi-party Litigation in a Nutshell 41-42.
120 Greer Practitioner’s Guide to Class Actions 60-61.
121 Section 33N(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act of 1976.
122 Section 33N. 
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means of dealing with the claims of group members123 also forms part of the 
American impracticability and superiority inquiries.124 At the very least, in 
both these class action regimes there is no room for concluding that joinder 
is practicable or appropriate solely on the basis that all the individual class 
members are identifiable.125 The same applies in respect of the class action 
regime of Ontario – the identifiability of all the class members does not 
necessarily exclude a class action as the preferable procedure.126 In view of 
these considerations, it therefore does not appear to be the case that where the 
class members are all identifiable, joinder is necessarily the most appropriate 
adjudication mechanism. Other relevant considerations should be taken into 
account in conducting the appropriateness-inquiry. These considerations will 
be dealt with in more detail below.
2 4 4 Access to justice
It is apparent from the approaches of the selected foreign jurisdictions 
that the class action objectives constitute important considerations when 
determining the appropriateness of a class action, compared to joinder. In 
the United States, the court in Safran v United Steelworkers of America 
AFL-CIO127 held that the “numerosity requirement reflects the general theory 
behind class action lawsuits which is to permit a large group of individuals 
whose interests are sufficiently related to bring one lawsuit, instead of many 
lawsuits, so as to conserve judicial resources and increase judicial access”.128 
As has been mentioned, in Femcare Finkelstein J for the Federal Court of 
Australia held that whether or not it is in the interests of justice to make an 
order that the representative proceeding be terminated requires consideration 
of the principal objects of the class action.129 Similarly, in the context of 
class proceedings in Ontario, the court in Hollick held that the class action 
objectives should constitute the lens through which the preferability inquiry 
should be conducted.130 In Excalibur, the Ontario Supreme Court, regarding 
the preferability inquiry, referred with approval to AIC.131 
Hurter suggests that for a class action to be successful in the South African 
context, it needs to be uniquely South African “and cannot be the product of 
selective and haphazard adaptations of foreign solutions. It should be borne 
in mind that such solutions evolved in response to practice specific needs and 
123 Section 33N(c) of the Federal Court of Australia Act of 1976.
124 For example, rule 23(b)(3) requires that a class action be superior to other methods for fair and efficient 
resolution of the conflict.
125 N Kirby “South Africa” in P G Karlsgodt (ed) World Class Actions – A Guide to Group and Representative 
Actions around the Globe 378 412; Greer Practitioner’s Guide to Class Actions 58; Anderson & Trask 
Class Action Playbook 26; and section 33H(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act of 1976.
126 In Keatley Surveying Inc v Teranet Inc 2014 ONSC 1677, Sachs J held that a plaintiff is only required to 
propose a class definition that provides for an identifiable class of two or more people – a plaintiff is not 
required to establish the actual existence of two or more potential class members.
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are therefore not necessarily applicable to our situation, or may come with 
undesirable baggage”.132 
It is submitted that our courts’ point of departure in determining whether 
a class action is the appropriate mechanism to adjudicate claimants’ claims 
should also be the principal objectives of a class action. This entails 
determining, with reference to the facts of the specific case, whether a class 
action is necessary to achieve access to justice, whether it is necessary to 
achieve judicial economy and/or whether it is necessary to effect behaviour 
modification. However, it is submitted that, in South Africa, access to justice 
should be the primary consideration when assessing the appropriateness 
of class proceedings compared to joinder, as was the case in Ngxuza and 
Pretorius. Section 34 of the Constitution enshrines the right of access to 
courts and states that “[e]veryone has the right to have any dispute that can 
be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before 
a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or 
forum”. The Constitution also recognises the values of human dignity and 
the advancement of human rights, and requires the State to respect, protect, 
promote, and fulfil the rights recognised in the Constitution. 
Giving priority to those who are particularly vulnerable, in particular 
because of historical and socio-economic factors, is constitutionally required.133 
Cameron JA, in Ngxuza, mentioned that the needs of these types of individuals 
should inform our understanding of the Constitution’s provisions and that it 
is against the background of their constitutional entitlements that section 38 
should be interpreted. He emphasised that section 39(2) of the Constitution 
enjoins the courts to promote the spirit, purport and object of the Bill of Rights 
when developing the common law. This is amplified by section 173 conferring 
an inherent power upon the courts to develop the common law, taking the 
interests of justice into account.134 
It is against the above background that it is submitted that our courts’ primary 
consideration in determining the appropriateness of class proceedings should 
be class members’ right to access to justice. For example, where the individual 
claimants are unable to litigate individually through joinder because they are 
drawn from the poorest portion of our society, access to justice dictates that 
a court should allow the matter to proceed as a class action. This ensures that 
the claimants’ financial and social circumstances do not serve to constitute a 
barrier to access to justice.135 
As mentioned, the test in AIC essentially entails conducting the preferability 
analysis through the lens of judicial economy, behaviour modification and 
access to justice, and considering whether the class action alternative will 
achieve access to justice. This inter alia entails determining whether there are 
economic, psychological, social, or procedural barriers to access to justice in 
132 Hurter (2008) De Jure 303-304. 
133 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) paras 8-9. See also Government 
of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 25, where it was held that “[r]ights 
also need to be interpreted and understood in their social and historical context”. 
134 Para 12.
135 1997 1 SA 124 (CC) para 14.
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the case.136 It is proposed that a test similar to the one formulated in AIC be 
applied by our courts to determine whether a class action is appropriate to 
adjudicate class members’ claims.
It is suggested that our courts, when determining the appropriateness of a 
class action, compared to joinder, firstly consider whether certification of a class 
action is necessary to achieve access to justice.137 In AIC it was held that “[a] 
class action will serve the goal of access to justice if (1) there are access to justice 
concerns that a class action could address; and (2) these concerns remain even 
when alternative avenues of redress are considered”.138 To determine whether 
certification is necessary to achieve access to justice, it must be determined 
whether there are any potential barriers to access to justice, the existence of 
which can effectively be addressed by certification of a class action.139 Possible 
barriers to access to justice include the geographical dispersion of class 
members; the inability of claimants to engage in individualised litigation; 
and, the difficulties associated with requiring litigation through joinder. These 
potential barriers are similar to those referred to by the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Robidoux v Celani140 where it was held 
that when determining the practicability of joinder, “[r]elevant considerations 
include judicial economy arising from the avoidance of a multiplicity of 
actions, geographic dispersion of class members, financial resources of class 
members, the ability of claimants to institute individual suits, and requests 
for prospective injunctive relief which would involve future class members”.141
The geographical dispersion of class members should be considered as a 
potential barrier to access to justice. As mentioned, the more geographically 
dispersed the class members are, the less likely it is that they will engage 
in individualised litigation and the more impractical it is to join those class 
136 2013 SCC 69 paras 24-38. 
137 For example, in Excalibur Special Opportunities LP v Schwartz Levitsky Feldman LLP 2007 ONCA 334, 
85 OR (3d) 321 para 217 Perell J held that it was not shown that “a class action is necessary to overcome 
any barriers to access to justice”. 
138 Para 26.
139 In the Ontario Law Reform Commission Report on Class Actions Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney 
General (1982) 121 it is stated that class actions can help overcome barriers to access to justice and may 
accordingly perform an important function in society. In Excalibur Special Opportunities LP v Schwartz 
Levitsky Feldman LLP 2007 ONCA 334, 85 OR (3d) 321 para 217 Perell J concluded that, on the facts, 
joinder was the preferable procedure inter alia because it was not shown that a “class action is necessary 
to overcome any barriers to access to justice”. In AIC Limited v Fischer 2013 SCC 69 paras 24-38 it 
was held that a court must consider whether there are barriers to access to justice in the given case. In 
Ministry of the Attorney General, British Columbia, Consultation Document: Class Action Litigation 
for British Columbia (1994) 8 it was held that “the opt out model is the more effective means to ensure 
that the barriers to justice, which class actions are intended to overcome, are reduced”. See also Alberta 
Law Reform Institute Class Actions (2000) Final Report No. 85 97; South African Law Commission 
The Recognition of Class Actions Report para 5.11; and, Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, 
Eastern Cape v Ngxuza 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA) paras 4-6.
140 987 F.2d 931.
141 936.
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members.142 In such circumstances, a class action is likely to be more appropriate 
than joinder as a mechanism to adjudicate class members’ claims.143 
The inability of claimants to engage in individualised litigation is a further 
potential barrier to access to justice. This barrier entails consideration of 
various factors, which may contribute to, or result in, the claimants’ inability 
to institute and pursue individual suits, such as whether the class members 
are poor and whether they lack resources.144 The poorer the individual class 
members are, the more likely it is that they would be unable to litigate in 
the absence of certification of the class action.145 A lack of resources and the 
inability of class members to meet the costs of legal representation generally 
mean that litigation through joinder would be too expensive.146 It is therefore 
likely that in such circumstances, a court would conclude that a class action is 
appropriate.147 Other relevant factors that our courts should consider that may 
contribute to the inability of claimants to engage in individualised litigation 
include: 
“[I]gnorance of the availability of substantive legal rights (Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report 
on Class Actions, vol. I (1982) (‘OLRC Report’), at p. 127), ignorance of the fact that significant 
injuries have occurred (OLRC Report, at pp. 127-28), limited language skills (see e.g. Rubenstein, 
at § 4:65), elderly age of the claimants (see e.g. Cloud v. Canada (Attorney General) (2004), 73 
O.R. (3d) 401 (C.A.)), frail emotional or physical state of the claimants (see e.g. Rumley v. British 
Columbia, 2001 SCC 69, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 184), fear of reprisals by the defendant (OLRC Report, at 
p. 128; see e.g. Webb v. K-Mart Canada Ltd. (1999), 45 O.R. (3d) 389 (S.C.J.)), or alienation from the 
legal system as a result of negative experiences with it (OLRC Report, at pp. 128-29) ...”148 
There may also be procedural hurdles that could deprive claimants of access 
to justice. It has been mentioned above that the primary difficulties associated 
with joinder is that it is a cumbersome and costly process. In Ngxuza, Cameron 
JA also referred to the technicalities in legal procedure, including joinder, as 
a possible barrier to access to justice.149 
142 See, eg, Dameron v Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore, Inc., 595 F. Supp 1404, 1408 (D Md 1984), aff’d in part and 
rev’d in part 815 F.2d 975 (4th Cir. 1987); In re Southeast Hotel Properties Limited Partnership Investor 
Litig, 151 F.R.D. 597, 601 (WDNC 1993). United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America 
Local 899 v Phoenix Associates, Inc, 152 F.R.D. 518, 522 (SD W Va 1994).
143 According to Anderson & Trask Class Action Playbook 27, if the class is limited to a specific geographical 
territory it is likely that joinder would be feasible. 
144 See South African Law Commission The Recognition of a Class Action in South African Law Working 
Paper 57 para 5.25. 
145 In Lake v First Nationwide Bank 156 FRD 615, 625 (E.d.Pa. 1994) it was held that, in performing the 
superiority analysis in terms of rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules, the court must consider the “inability of 
the poor or uninformed to enforce their rights, and the improbability that large numbers of class members 
would possess the initiative to litigate individually”. See similarly Permanent Secretary, Department of 
Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ngxuza 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA) para 6. See also M Nyenti “Access to Justice in 
the South African Social Security System: Towards a Conceptual Approach” (2013) 4 De Jure 901 914. 
146 See Gold Fields Limited v Motley Rice LLC, In re: Nkala v Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited 2015 
4 SA 299 (GJ) para 55.
147 See Robidoux v Celani 987 F.2d 931 936.
148 2013 SCC 69 para 27. See also Nyenti (2013) De Jure 914, where he states that “knowledge of rights is a 
prerequisite to access to justice”. 
149 Para 6. See also Eggleston v Chicago Journeymen Plumbers’ Local Union No. 130, U.A. 657 F.2d 890, 
895 (7th Cir. 1981); Kirby “South Africa” in World Class Actions – A Guide to Group and Representative 
Actions around the Globe 386; Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ngxuza 
2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA) paras 4-6. 
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Our courts should accordingly consider, on the facts of the case, whether 
certification of a class action is necessary to overcome the above-mentioned 
barriers and to achieve access to justice.150 
2 4 5 Practical considerations
However, it is submitted that simply considering potential barriers to access 
to justice and determining whether certification is necessary to overcome 
those barriers, is insufficient to assess the appropriateness of a class action. 
Although access to justice, informed by the above-mentioned factors, should 
constitute the primary consideration, the courts’ assessment should further 
be informed by practical considerations that are otherwise relevant to 
determining the appropriateness of class actions compared to joinder.151 
Our courts should also consider the judicial economy that would arise 
if the multiplicity of actions were avoided as well as the necessity of class 
proceedings to effect behaviour modification. Achieving judicial economy 
would entail conjoining a number of lawsuits that would otherwise have been 
brought separately.152 Behaviour modification would entail deterring potential 
defendants, who may otherwise have assumed that their minor wrongs would 
not result in litigation, from similar future wrongdoing.153
Apart from considering judicial economy and behaviour modification, it 
is further proposed that the courts should also consider any other practical 
consideration that may be relevant when determining the appropriateness 
of class proceedings. Such considerations could typically include the 
manageability of the class action;154 whether the class members’ claims are 
large enough to warrant being pursued separately;155 and the importance of 
the common issues in relation to the claims as a whole. The manageability of 
150 In Robidoux v Celani 987 F.2d 931 936 it was held that the “[d]etermination of practicability depends on 
all the circumstances surrounding a case…”
151 See Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ngxuza 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA) para 16. 
152 See, eg, the approach in Ontario as set out in Excalibur Special Opportunities LP v Schwartz Levitsky 
Feldman LLP 2007 ONCA 334, 85 OR (3d) 321 para 217. See also Hollick v Toronto (City) 2001 3 SCR 
158 paras 27-32; Markson v MBNA Canada Bank 2007 ONCA 334, 85 OR (3d) 321 paras 69-70; Excalibur 
Special Opportunities LP v Schwartz Levitsky Feldman LLP 2015 ONSC 1634 para 26; AIC Limited v 
Fischer 2013 SCC 69 paras 24-38; Bright v Femcare Limited 2002 FCAFC 243; 195 ALR 574 para 152. 
See also South African Law Commission The Recognition of Class Actions Report para 5.11.3.
153 Western Canadian Shopping Centres v Dutton (2001) 2 S.C.R. 534 para 29. See also R Mulheron The 
Class Action in Common Law Legal Systems: A Comparative Perspective (2004) 6.
154 For the type of considerations that could typically inform the manageability of the class action see, for 
example, Anderson & Trask Class Action Playbook 62; Eisen v Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S 156, 164 
(1974); Carnegie v Mutual Saving Life Insurance Company No. CV-99-S-3292-NE, 2002 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
21396, 76-77 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 1, 2002); Hollick v Toronto (City) 2001 3 SCR 158 para 32; Markson v MBNA 
Canada Bank 2007 ONCA 334, 85 OR (3d) 321 paras 69-70; and, Excalibur Special Opportunities LP v 
Schwartz Levitsky Feldman LLP 2007 ONCA 334, 85 OR (3d) 321 para 217.
155 In Trustees for the time being of the Children’s Resource Centre Trust v Pioneer Food (Pty) Ltd (Legal 
Resources Centre as amicus curiae) 2013 1 All SA 648 (SCA) para 19, Wallis JA mentions considerations 
that are relevant to determining the appropriateness of class proceedings compared to joinder, including 
considering whether the claims are large enough to warrant being pursued separately. See also Permanent 
Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ngxuza 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA) paras 4-5. 
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the class action entails taking into account inter alia the size of the class,156 the 
identifiability of class members,157 and the extent of the non-common issues 
that would require individualised adjudication. The weight given to each of 
these factors should vary in proportion to those factors that form part of the 
access to justice consideration. For example, although the class members are 
identifiable, if the individual claimants are poor and therefore unable to litigate 
through joinder, a court should not find that the fact that they are identifiable 
makes joinder the appropriate means for adjudicating the claimants’ claims. 
Extensive provision needs to be made for individuals who are not in a social 
or financial position to seek legal redress.158 
Importantly, as part of the practical considerations referred to above, a 
court would need to consider the manageability of class proceedings. Judicial 
management is considered to be increasingly important for the effective 
functioning of civil litigation in general, and of the class action system 
in particular.159 Moreover, as class action litigation is traditionally more 
complex than other kinds of litigation, it requires greater administration and 
management of the case.160 Where manageability problems occur during the 
course of class proceedings, they could potentially result in the termination 
of the class action.161 
The South African Law Commission (“SALC”) has recommended that, 
because class actions are complex and the rights and obligations of absent 
class members are determined, our courts should be more active in managing 
class actions compared to ordinary litigation.162 It accordingly proposed that 
“the courts should be given broad general management powers exercisable 
either on the application of a party or class member or on the court’s own 
motion”.163 Although the draft legislation proposed by the SALC does not 
156 Regarding the numerosity requirement contained in rule 23 of the Federal Rules, the bigger the class the 
more likely it is that joinder would be impracticable. See Greer A Practitioner’s Guide to Class Actions 
58; Klonoff Class Actions and Other Multi-party Litigation in a Nutshell 131; section 33N(1)(d) of the 
Federal Court of Australia Act of 1976; Cashman Class Action Law and Practice 321; Nkala v Harmony 
Gold Mining Company Limited ZAGPJHC case nos 48226/12, 31324/12, 31326/12, 31327/12, 48226/12, 
08108/13 of 13 May 2016 para 52.
157 According to Klonoff Class Actions and Other Multi-party Litigation in a Nutshell 40, the approach of 
the United States is that the identifiability of individual class members will form part of the assessment 
of the impracticability of joinder. It is not the only consideration in determining the practicability of 
joinder compared to class actions. See also Keatley Surveying Inc v Teranet Inc 2014 ONSC 1677; Kirby 
“South Africa” in World Class Actions – A Guide to Group and Representative Actions around the Globe 
378 412; Greer Practitioner’s Guide to Class Actions 58; Anderson & Trask Class Action Playbook 26; 
and section 33H(2) of the Federal Court of Australia Act of 1976. 
158 See Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ngxuza 2001 4 SA 1184 (SCA) paras 
4-5.
159 C Piché “Judging Fairness in Class Action Settlements” (2010) 28 Windsor YB Access Just 111 121.
160 According to Karlsgodt “United States” in World Class Actions – A Guide to Group and Representative 
Actions around the Globe 44, a tool that is regarded as useful in managing class action proceedings in 
the United States is to require the submission of a trial plan. See also Piché (2010) Windsor YB Access 
Just 117.
161 In Eisen v Carlisle and Jacquelin 417 US 156 (1974) the enormity of the class and related issues such as 
notice to absent members and the distribution of an aggregate award to class members caused serious 
doubt about the viability of the case. 
162 South African Law Commission The Recognition of Class Actions Report para 5.9.2.
163 Para 5.9.4.
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expressly incorporate the manageability of class actions as a factor to be 
considered at the certification stage, it will no doubt play a role in the context 
of other questions. For example, it would be relevant in deciding whether a 
class action would be the appropriate method of adjudicating class members’ 
claims.164 If a class action would turn out to be unmanageable, it is unlikely 
that class proceedings would be regarded as appropriate.
3 Conclusion
A central theme in this article has been the importance of access to justice, 
and how it could serve as the foundation for the incorporation of the class 
action into South African law. It is essentially against this background that a 
court should decide on the appropriateness of class proceedings as a means of 
adjudicating the claims of class members. 
Our courts’ assessment should be aimed at establishing whether certification 
of a class action is necessary to achieve access to justice. This includes 
considering whether any possible barriers exist and whether certification is 
necessary to overcome such barriers. Further, the appropriateness inquiry 
entails determining whether a class action is necessary to achieve judicial 
economy and behaviour modification. Finally, the court should consider 
any other relevant factor(s) that may assist it in determining whether class 
proceedings are otherwise appropriate. In the light of these considerations, it 
is suggested that, when a court is required to determine whether a class action 
is the most appropriate means of adjudicating class members’ claims, the court 
should adopt the following test. The test takes account of the experiences of 
foreign jurisdictions and the South African class action experience to date, 
and it requires a court to balance various considerations. The court should: 
1. determine whether certification of a class action is necessary to achieve 
access to justice. This entails considering whether there are any potential 
barriers to such access, the existence of which could be effectively 
addressed by certification of a class action. The following factors may be 
considered in this regard: 
a. the geographical dispersion of class members; 
b. the inability of class members to engage in individualised litigation; 
and 
c. the difficulties associated with litigation through joinder; 
2. determine whether a class action is necessary to achieve the judicial 
economy arising from the avoidance of a multiplicity of actions; 
3. determine whether a class action is necessary to achieve behaviour 
modification; and 
4. take all the surrounding circumstances into account and consider any 
other relevant factor(s) that may assist it in determining whether a class 
action is otherwise appropriate, including: 
a. the manageability of the class action; 
164 De Vos (1996) TSAR 649-650. 
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b. the importance of the common issues in relation to the claims as a 
whole; and 
c. whether the class members’ claims are large enough to warrant 
being pursued separately. 
The manageability of the class action under point 4.a in the above suggested 
test requires taking into account inter alia the identifiability of class members, 
the size of the class and the extent of the non-common issues that would 
require individualised adjudication. Moreover, determining whether it is 
“otherwise appropriate” to certify a class action in terms of point 4 above 
entails taking all circumstances surrounding the case into account.165 In other 
words, the manageability of the class action under part 4.a above should not 
be the only or even dominant consideration taken into account in assessing the 
appropriateness of class proceedings, as opposed to other mechanisms such 
as joinder, as a means of adjudicating the claims of class members. Rather, a 
holistic, common sense and pragmatic approach needs to be adopted where 
the assessment is made, having regard to all the circumstances of the case. 
It is further recommended that to promote legal certainty, consistency and 
uniformity in respect of the approaches of our superior courts, legislation 
should be adopted to regulate our courts’ assessment of class proceedings’ 
appropriateness as set out above 
The above-mentioned observations do not, however, detract from the fact 
that the identifiability of class members is important as it essentially informs 
the court’s decision regarding how notification to potential class members 
should take place; to decide who forms part of the class and may accordingly 
institute individual actions; and to establish who will be bound by the court’s 
order.166 This is significant in that, in class proceedings, once a final judgment 
or settlement is reached, the claims of members of the class are res judicata. 
Without a proper class definition, a large number of people may be deprived 
of their right to seek legal relief for a violation of their rights without having 
been provided with a fair opportunity to exercise a real choice as to whether 
to associate themselves with the class action. This would not only undermine 
their right of access to justice, but would be contrary to the object of public 
interest litigation, which is to give poor people a meaningful voice in litigation 
that affects them.167
SUMMARY
In Trustees for the time being of the Children’s Resource Centre Trust v Pioneer Food (Pty) 
Ltd (Legal Resources Centre as amicus curiae), Wallis JA held that in defining the class it is not 
necessary to identify all the members of the class otherwise the question would arise whether a class 
action was necessary as joinder in terms of the court rules would be permissible. He held that what is 
required is that the class be defined with sufficient particularity that a specific person’s membership 
can be objectively determined by examining his or her situation in light of the class definition. It 
165 W de Vos “Opt-in class action for damages vindicated by Constitutional Court” (2013) 4 TSAR 757 
762-763. 
166 Erasmus & van Loggerenberg Erasmus: Superior Court Practice A2-23. 
167 S Liebenberg “From the Crucible of the Eastern Cape: New Legal Tools for the Poor” (2014) 28 Speculum 
Juris 1 4. 
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can accordingly be inferred that, where the claimants are all identifiable, irrespective of the size of 
the class, they may need to be joined as plaintiffs to the proceedings. Class action proceedings may 
therefore not be the appropriate procedural device to be utilised in such circumstances. The problem, 
however, is that where the class comprises a large group of persons, joinder may be cumbersome 
and largely unfeasible. This potential problem is significant in that a court ordering joinder in such 
circumstances could potentially undermine the very foundation for the incorporation of the class 
action in to South African law, namely, access to justice. The article will accordingly consider what 
the test is that our courts should apply and what the factors are that it should take into consideration 
when determining the appropriateness of a class action as opposed to joinder. These issues have not 
yet been subject to a comprehensive and critical analysis with regard to the procedural approaches of 
prominent foreign jurisdictions, which is what the article will aim to do.
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